## 1NC

#### Economic engagement has to be conditional

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### **Violation – The aff is unconditional**

## 1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should enter into negotiations with Canada and Mexico seeking:

#### a North American Plan for Infrastructure and Transportation

#### the elimination of rules of origin and the establishment of a common external tariff

#### the establishment of a North American Commission on Regulatory Convergence

#### the establishment of a fund for North American research centers

#### The CP solves the aff better and will capture every benefit of the TPP – but sequencing matters. The CP creates a stronger North American negotiating position for future trade deals

Pastor 12 – professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University (Robert A, “North America or Asia? The 21st Century Choice for the United States,” 1/23/12, http://www.canambusco.org/resources/UofMiamiPerspectives-Pastor-NA\_or\_Asia-FINAL.pdf)//SJF

Introduction While the debate on the costs and benefits of globalization continues, the world economy seems increasingly divided into three regions - a dynamic East Asia, a crisisprone Euro-Zone, and an uninspired North America. Each region faces formidable challenges, but only North America seems unaware that, at this time, its future competitiveness depends more on addressing its continental problems than in relating to the other markets. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Hawaii in November 2011, President Barack Obama sought to hitch the stalled U.S. economy to a growing East Asia. His vehicle is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade proposal with eight small Asian countries. If his purpose is to balance China or prevent it from dominating Asia economically - both sensible goals - then he's purchased the wrong car. The TPP won't take us there. Nor will it create American jobs. If the President Obama wants to double exports and give a positive jolt to the U.S. economy, he should give priority to forging a seamless market with Canada and Mexico. Though he may be tempted to think he can do TPP and North America at the same time, he should reflect on the fact that it took eight years to accomplish a simpler task – free-trade agreements with Panama and Colombia. If, instead, he embarked on a concerted strategy to deepen integration with Canada and Mexico, he would not only stimulate the U.S. economy, he would strengthen our region's bargaining power with Asia. The United States needs to think strategically and sequentially. In a world of three competing regions, he should draw from the region of our greatest strength - North America - to help the economy, open Asia and reassume global leadership. A World of Competing Regions Together, East Asia, Europe and North America constitute about 80 percent of the world's product and trade, and most trade occurs within each region rather than between them. Even in an age of globalization, proximity matters. During the past 15 years, the regions have performed somewhat differently than most people think. Parts of East Asia have achieved the highest growth rates, but as a whole, the region's share of world product declined from 25 percent to 22 percent. The European Union's share increased from 26 percent to 28 percent. Most surprising, the gross product of the three countries of North America soared from 30 percent of the world in 1994, as NAFTA was implemented, to 36 percent in 2001. Since then, it has declined to 29 percent, but it remains the largest economic bloc of the three. Faced with the most urgent crisis, the European Union has taken the boldest, most long-term approach. Instead of fragmenting or retreating to unilateralism, the region is forging a fiscal union that will discipline its members' budgets while investing in the region's future. When faced with a financial crisis in 1997, Asia assembled a stabilization fund and began negotiating free-trade agreements within the region. In contrast to Europe and Asia, the leaders of North America took a few timid steps toward constructing an edifice on a NAFTA base, and then they retreated. In 2005, President Bush and his Mexican and Canadian counterparts proposed a "Security and Prosperity Partnership" (SPP). The SPP contained a broad set of goals to harmonize regulations, improve border efficiency and deepen integration using dozens of interbureaucratic working groups. When the SPP was criticized by the right for undermining U.S. sovereignty, and by the left for being too solicitous of business at the expense of workers, Bush lost interest in it. In 2008, with SPP languishing, the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks stalled and Asia negotiating regional agreements, Bush's Trade Negotiator Susan Schwab joined representatives of four small open economies that were negotiating the TPP. Neither the TPP nor the SPP flourished, and when President Obama was inaugurated, he discarded the SPP, put the TPP in limbo, and placed trade policy in the deep freeze. After the Republicans won the House of Representatives in 2010, Obama rediscovered the need for a trade policy and negotiated a compromise with Congress to approve the Panama, Colombia and South Korean free-trade agreements with a trade adjustment assistance package. Then, as host of the APEC Summit, the president decided to retrieve the TPP and feature it as the meeting's crowning achievement. Unfortunately, the policy seems to be driven more by headlines – the rise of China and the fall in jobs – than by a systematic assessment as to which strategy – TPP or economic integration in North America – was more likely to help the American economy. There is no evidence that the Administration ever did such an analysis. If it had, it would have learned that it over-estimated the TPP and under-estimated North America. Four of the eight TPP countries – Singapore, Australia, Peru and Chile – already have free trade agreements with the United States. The other four – Brunei, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Vietnam – have very small economies. All eight countries have a combined gross product of about one-seventh of Canada and Mexico. What is the TPP? Michael Froman, the deputy national security advisor for economic affairs, who was formerly with Citigroup and has played a leading role in the Obama Administration in giving priority to Asia and the TPP over North and Latin America, called the TPP "among the most important and historic developments in international trade in recent years."1 He described the TPP's "unique" qualities as being "comprehensive," meaning it would eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers; address cross-cutting issues, like regulations and the digital economy; and encourage competitiveness, development, and small business. Of course, these qualities are not unique to TPP; they are part of NAFTA and other free-trade agreements. The TPP would be the first U.S. trade agreement with Asian-Pacific countries, and it would be unique if it eliminated all trade barriers without exceptions, but that is a dubious proposition. On the eve of the November 2011 APEC Summit in Hawaii, Japan said it wanted to consult about participating in the negotiations on TPP, and Mexico and Canada followed with a similar announcement. Japan is probably trying to keep one foot on both sides of the Pacific, and Canada and Mexico are trying to defend what they had gained from NAFTA. Including these countries will undoubtedly slow down the negotiating process and could preclude an agreement. Japan and Canada would have to dismantle very high barriers on agriculture, as would the United States, but it is doubtful that any of them could overcome the pressures of their farm lobbies, particularly if Europe shows no interest in reciprocating. If the TPP’s purpose is to put pressure on China to open its market, that won’t work for four reasons. Some of the TPP provisions pressed by the United States, e.g., on government procurement and neutralizing state-owned enterprises, are aimed at China, which will not accommodate Washington. Second, the United States is already open to Chinese goods, and so why would China change these policies in exchange for what it already has? Third, the other eight countries are very small and also open to China. And fourth, one week after the APEC Summit, China joined Japan and South Korea to announce steps to expedite a free-trade agreement among themselves and with the ASEAN countries. In brief, China already trumped the United States. The North American Option In trying to explain to his fellow Americans the importance of APEC, Obama noted that 61 percent of all U.S. exports are sent to these twenty-one countries. He neglected, however, to mention that more than half of that goes to just two countries – Canada and Mexico. Few Americans realize that the two largest markets for U.S. goods are not China and Japan, but Canada and Mexico. Moreover, the expansion of trade with our neighbors has a more favorable impact on the U.S. economy because a much larger portion of our imports from them are actually composed of our exports to them. Both Mexico and Canada have become very open economies. As they grow – and both have grown faster than the United States in the last two years – our exports grow. In 2010, the United States exported almost three times as much to Canada as to China and almost two times as much to Mexico as to China. Our total trade with our two neighbors in 2010 exceeded $1 trillion – 30 percent more than with China and Japan. More importantly, the best markets to expand U.S. exports are not in Asia but with our neighbors. For every additional dollar that our neighbors buy from abroad, about 80 cents are spent on U.S. exports, and for every additional dollar that we import from our neighbors, a large proportion – over 40 percent – is actually our exports to them. We no longer just trade products; we make them together. Unawareness of our neighbors’ importance may explain why the Obama administration chose the TPP over North America, and it may also explain why President Obama proposed a “Buy American” provision in his jobs bill in 2009. That was a violation of NAFTA, and after negotiating for more than a year with Canada to change the provision, the president repeated the same mistake in the summer of 2011 with his second jobs bill. If the president understood the importance of Canada and Mexico, he would have proposed a “Buy North American” provision, and instead of a U.S. Infrastructure Fund, he would have suggested a “North American Infrastructure Fund.” Both of those provisions would do more to stimulate the U.S. economy and create jobs than TPP. North America was a formidable region by 2001, just seven years after NAFTA. By then, trade tripled among the three countries, the number of U.S. jobs expanded at historic rates, and the region’s share of the world product increased from 30 percent to 36 percent. However, rather than move forward on a new, more complex agenda, the three governments turned their attention elsewhere. By 2009, the growth in trade and investment among the three countries of North America declined by more than half, and North America’s share of the world product dropped. In retrospect, North America peaked in 2001 because of new security-related barriersinstalled at the border because of 9/11, Chinese commercial power and a lack of investment in infrastructure. But the main reason is the lack of imagination and leadership of the three leaders of the United States, Canada and Mexico. Rather than negotiating a common approach to the North American agenda, the three governments reverted to unequal and ineffective dual-bilateralism, with the United States negotiating the same issues separately with Canada and Mexico. The United States and Canada issued "Action Plans" on the border and on regulatory convergence on December 8, 2011. A week later, the United States and Mexico issued a similar plan on the border, and they will issue a similar plan on regulations in a month. The truth is that the plans are actually "Inaction Plans," or rather, they set terms of reference for numerous studies on the two subjects to be completed at the end of 2012. Secondly, the plans with Canada are quite similar to those with Mexico, except that Mexico's plan includes some specific decisions on expansion of border crossings and facilities, and the Canadian plan omits any reference to the most important and longest-lasting border problem, the need for a second bridge between Windsor and Detroit. Instead of duplicating their work, U.S. officials would have used their time more efficiently if they had forged a continental approach to similar or shared problems. To make the U.S. more competitive with Asia, we need to change the conventional paradigm of "North America." We need to think "North American" rather than "Buy American." Instead of altering our tax policies to encourage investment in the United States, we should promote investments in the continent. If we shift "our mind's eye," as Albert Einstein once put it, new opportunities in North America will open, but there are also a few steps that we could take that would put us on the right road: • The three transport ministers of Canada, the United States and Mexico should negotiate a North American Plan for Infrastructure and Transportation – to create new trade corridors that would extend from Canada to the south of Mexico, building roads and communications that would strengthen the region's economies and commerce. This would be the centerpiece of a true continental market. • The three leaders should eliminate costly "rules of origin" – an inefficient tax estimated at over $500 million per year – and establish a common external tariff. The common revenues should then be used to establish a "North American Investment Fund," whose principal goal would be to fund, with supplements from the three governments, the North American Plan for Infrastructure and Transportation. • The three governments should establish several lean institutions, including a North American Commission on Regulatory Convergence; a North American Advisory Group that would do research and provide options for the three governments to improve competitiveness and security in North America; and a North American Inter-Parliamentary Committee (combining the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican Parliamentary Committees) to ensure that the elected representatives of the three countries are consulted at every stage of the process. • The three leaders should provide scholarships for students to study in each others’ countries and a small, annual fund of $10 million to support North American research centers. These Centers could provide ideas and education to counter fears and erroneous information and to build interest in a North American community.

## 1NC

#### **US economic engagement with Mexico is a vehicle for neoliberal exploitation for the entire region – the plan becomes a tool for military intervention and US security interests while strengthening its economic grip over Latin America**

Jacobs, 04 – Assistant Prof of Polisci at West Virginia University (Jamie Elizabeth, "Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America," Latin American Politics & Society 46.4 (2004) 149-152, MUSE)//VP

The advance of neoliberalism suffers no shortage of critics, both from its supporters who seek a greater balance in the interests of North and South, and from its opponents who see it as lacking any real choice for developing states. The spread of neoliberalism is viewed by its strongest critics as part of the continuing expression of Western power through the mechanisms of globalization, often directly linked to the hegemonic power of the United States. Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva Campos have assembled a collection of articles that pushes this debate in a somewhat new direction. This compilation addresses the question from a different perspective, focusing not on the neoliberal process as globalization but on neoliberalism as the new guise of panamericanism, which emphasizes a distinctly political overtone in the discussion. The edited volume argues that neoliberalism reanimates a system of relations in the hemisphere that reinforces the most negative aspects of the last century's U.S.-dominated panamericanism. The assembled authors offer a critical view that places neoliberalism squarely in the realm of U.S. hegemonic exploitation of interamerican relations. This volume, furthermore, articulates a detailed vision of the potential failures of this approach in terms of culture, politics, security, and economics for both North and South. Oliva and Prevost present a view from Latin America that differs from that of other works that emphasize globalization as a general or global process. This volume focuses on the implementation of free market capitalism in the Americas as a continuation of the U.S. history of hegemonic control of the hemisphere. While Oliva and Prevost and the other authors featured in this volume point to the changes that have altered global relations since the end of the Cold War—among them an altered balance of power, shifting U.S. strategy, and evolving interamerican relations—they all view the U.S. foreign policy of neoliberalism and economic integration essentially as old wine in new bottles. As such, old enemies (communism) are replaced by new (drugs and terrorism), but the fear of Northern domination of and intervention in Latin America remains. Specifically, Oliva and Prevost identify the process through which "economics had taken center stage in interamerican affairs." They [End Page 149] suggest that the Washington Consensus—diminishing the state's role in the economy, privatizing to reduce public deficits, and shifting more fully to external markets—was instead a recipe for weakened governments susceptible to hemispheric domination by the United States (xi). The book is divided into two main sections that emphasize hemispheric and regional issues, respectively. The first section links more effectively to the overall theme of the volume in its chapters on interamerican relations, culture, governance, trade, and security. In the first of these chapters, Oliva traces the evolution of U.S. influence in Latin America and concludes that, like the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in the past, the prospect of hemispheric economic integration will be marked by a dominant view privileging U.S. security, conceptualized in transnational, hemispheric terms, that is both asymmetrical and not truly integrated among all members. In this context, Oliva identifies the free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) as "an economic project suited to a hemispheric context that is politically favorable to the United States" (20). The chapters in this section are strongest when they focus on the political aspects of neoliberalism and the possible unintended negative consequences that could arise from the neoliberal program. Carlos Alzugaray Treto draws on the history of political philosophy, traced to Polanyi, identifying ways that social inequality has the potential to undermine the stable governance that is so crucial a part of the neoliberal plan. He goes on to point out how this potential for instability could also generate a new period of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. Treto also analyzes how the "liberal peace" could be undermined by the "right of humanitarian intervention" in the Americas if the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia served as a model for U.S. involvement in the hemisphere. Hector Luis Saint-Pierre raises the issue of "democratic neoauthoritarianism," responsible for "restricting citizenship to the exercise of voting, limiting its voice to electoral polls of public opinion, restraining human rights to consumer's rights, [and] shutting down spaces to the citizens' participation" (116). While these critiques are leveled from a structuralist viewpoint, they often highlight concerns expressed from other theoretical perspectives and subfields (such as the literature on citizenship and participation in the context of economic integration). These chapters also emphasize the way inattention to economic, social, and political crisis could damage attempts at integration and the overall success of the neoliberal paradigm in the Americas. In general, the section on hemispheric issues offers a suspicious view of the U.S. role in promoting integration, arguing that in reality, integration offers a deepening of historical asymmetries of power, the potential to create new justifications for hegemonic intervention, and the further weakening of state sovereignty in the South. [End Page 150] If the first section of the book is joined with skepticism of integration as panamericanism and chooses to focus broadly on the negative effects of the implementation of these policies, part 2 links these regional issues with the politics of specific countries. This section offers articles that speak to country-specific issues in a regional context and to ways that bilateral relations with the United States shape the overall context of regional and hemispheric integration. The regional issues range from CARICOM's evolution to the different approaches to balancing human security and globalization in Central America, the special relationship of Mexico and the United States, and the disincentives for political parties to embrace the Mercosur process. Again, the authors offer continued pessimism about the process of integration unless Latin American states can exercise more control over its evolution. Key to this idea of alternative integration are Brazil and Mexico, the former more successful in asserting its independence than the latter, in the authors' view. Jaime Preciado Coronado singles out the geopolitics of U.S.-Mexican relations and their magnified effect in the region, where the United States has collaborated in Mexico's insertion into the world networks of interdependence and, in return, Mexico promotes the idea of the Washington Consensus intensely and its model of the promotion of free trade with the United States for the rest of Latin America, in order to achieve the consolidation of the continental bloc that maintains American hegemony through the use of the advantages of the international division of labor.

#### Neoliberalism causes extinction

Darder, 10 – Professor Antonia Darder, Distinguished Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign (“Preface” in *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement* by Richard V. Kahn, 2010, pp. x-xiii)//VP

GENDER MODIFIED

It is fitting to begin my words about Richard Kahn’s Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement with a poem. The direct and succinct message of The Great Mother Wails cuts through our theorizing and opens us up to the very heart of the book’s message—to ignite a fire that speaks to **the ecological crisis** at hand; a crisis orchestrated by the inhumane greed and economic brutality of the wealthy. Nevertheless, as is clearly apparent, none of us is absolved from complicity with the devastating destruction of the earth. As members of the global community, we are all implicated in this destruction by the very manner in which we define ourselves, each other, and all living beings with whom we reside on the earth. Everywhere we look there are glaring signs of political systems and social structures that propel us toward **unsustainability and extinction**. In this historical moment, the planet faces some of the most horrendous forms of “[hu]man-made” devastation ever known to humankind. Cataclysmic “natural disasters” in the last decade have sung the environmental hymns of planetary imbalance and reckless environmental disregard. A striking feature of this ecological crisis, both locally and globally, is the **overwhelming concentration of wealth** held by the ruling elite and their agents of capital. This environmental malaise is characterized by the staggering loss of livelihood among working people everywhere; gross inequalities in educational opportunities; an absence of health care for millions; an unprecedented number of people living behind bars; and trillions spent on fabricated wars fundamentally tied to the control and domination of the planet’s resources. The Western ethos of mastery and supremacy over nature has accompanied, to our detriment, the unrelenting expansion of capitalism and its unparalleled domination over all aspects of human life. This hegemonic worldview has been unmercifully imparted through a host of public policies and practices that conveniently gloss over gross inequalities as commonsensical necessities for democracy to bloom. As a consequence, the liberal democratic rhetoric of “we are all created equal” hardly begins to touch the international pervasiveness of racism, patriarchy, technocracy, and economic piracy by the West, all which have fostered the erosion of civil rights and the unprecedented ecological exploitation of societies, creating conditions that now threaten our peril, if we do not reverse directions. Cataclysmic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, are unfortunate testimonies to the danger of ignoring the warnings of the natural world, especially when coupled with egregious governmental neglect of impoverished people. Equally disturbing, is the manner in which ecological crisis is vulgarly exploited by unscrupulous and ruthless capitalists who see no problem with turning a profit off the backs of ailing and mourning oppressed populations of every species—whether they be victims of weather disasters, catastrophic illnesses, industrial pollution, or inhumane practices of incarceration. Ultimately, these constitute ecological calamities that speak to the inhumanity and tyranny of material profiteering, at the expense of precious life. The arrogance and exploitation of neoliberal values of consumption dishonor the contemporary suffering of poor and marginalized populations around the globe. Neoliberalism denies or simply mocks (“Drill baby drill!”) the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists between all living beings, including the body earth. In its stead, values of individualism, competition, privatization, and the “free market” systematically debase the ancient ecological knowledge of indigenous populations, who have, implicitly or explicitly, rejected the fabricated ethos of “progress and democracy” propagated by the West. In its consuming frenzy to gobble up the natural resources of the planet for its own hyperbolic quest for material domination, the exploitative nature of capitalism and its burgeoning technocracy has dangerously deepened the structures of social exclusion, through the destruction of the very biodiversity that has been key to our global survival for millennia. Kahn insists that this devastation of all species and the planet must be fully recognized and soberly critiqued. But he does not stop there. Alongside, he rightly argues for political principles of engagement for the construction of a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that is founded on economic redistribution, cultural and linguistic democracy, indigenous sovereignty, universal human rights, and a fundamental respect for all life. As such, Kahn seeks to bring us all back to a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is unquestionably rooted in an integral order of knowledge, imbued with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom. Within the context of such an ecologically grounded epistemology, Kahn uncompromisingly argues that our organic relationship with the earth is also intimately tied to our struggles for cultural self-determination, environmental sustainability, social and material justice, and global peace. Through a carefully framed analysis of past disasters and current ecological crisis, Kahn issues an urgent call for a critical ecopedagogy that makes central explicit articulations of the ways in which societies construct ideological, political, and cultural systems, based on social structures and practices that can serve to promote ecological sustainability and biodiversity or, conversely, lead us down a disastrous path of unsustainability and extinction. In making his case, Kahn provides a grounded examination of the manner in which consuming capitalism manifests its repressive force throughout the globe, disrupting the very ecological order of knowledge essential to the planet’s sustainability. He offers an understanding of critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that inherently critiques the history of Western civilization and the anthropomorphic assumptions that sustain patriarchy and the subjugation of all subordinated living beings—assumptions that continue to inform traditional education discourses around the world. Kahn incisively demonstrates how a theory of multiple technoliteracies can be used to effectively critique the ecological corruption and destruction behind mainstream uses of technology and the media in the interest of the neoliberal marketplace. As such, his work points to the manner in which the sustainability rhetoric of mainstream environmentalism actually **camouflages** wretched neoliberal policies and practices that left unchecked **hasten the annihilation of the globe’s ecosystem**. True to its promise, the book cautions that any anti-hegemonic resistance movement that claims social justice, universal human rights, or global peace must contend forthrightly with the deteriorating ecological crisis at hand, as well as consider possible strategies and relationships that rupture the status quo and transform environmental conditions that threaten disaster. A failure to integrate ecological sustainability at the core of our political and pedagogical struggles for liberation, Kahn argues, is to blindly and misguidedly adhere to an anthropocentric worldview in which emancipatory dreams are deemed solely about human interests, without attention either to the health of the planet or to the well-being of all species with whom we walk the earth.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1ac to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production- that is a prerequisite to breaking down neoliberalism

**Walsh, 12** – Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)//VP

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

## 1NC

#### Obama is pushing Congress to resolve the debt ceiling – political capital is key to success and solving a government shut down

Pace 9/12 Julie, AP White House correspondent, Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda, The Fresno Bee, 9/12/13, http://www.fresnobee.com/2013/09/12/3493538/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis.¶ "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach.¶ "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said.¶ The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1.¶ Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities.¶ Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support.¶ Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012.¶ Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers.¶ "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is."¶ For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action.¶ Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.¶ That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul.¶ On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law.¶ The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending.

#### The TPP is unpopular

**Capling and Ravenhill 11** - Ann Capling went to the University of Melbourne, John Ravenhill went to the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, (“Multilateralising regionalism: what role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?, December 12, 2011 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512748.2011.634078)//sawyer

Of particular note here has been the capacity of protectionist forces in the US Congress to deny the President a renewal of trade promotion authority, and to signal that their opposition to agreements is so deep seated that the Administration refrains from placing them before the Senate for ratiﬁcation (seen with the Korean and Colombian agreements under both the Bush and Obama administrations). **Substantial opposition to the TPP was expressed in the US Congress even before the negotiations began**. In particular, the US trade deﬁcit with China has increased domestic protectionist pressures and has led many to question the beneﬁt of free trade with developing countries more generally (Aggarwal 2010). The TPP has become caught up in a more general tide of skepticism towards bilateral trade agreements, and in a push by trade unionists and civil society groups, more generally, to see these agreements include provisions on labour rights and environmental protection. And it also attracted opposition speciﬁc to the proposed agreement itself, in particular from dairy interests concerned at the potential competition from NZ’s efﬁcient exporters (Fergusson and Vaughn 2010). The National Milk Producer’s Federation has sought to exclude the dairy industry in any trade agreement with NZ – in March 2010, 30 US Senators wrote to the US Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, warning that opening the US market to NZ dairy products would pose a major threat to the US industry. But opposition to the proposed agreement was not conﬁned to the dairy industry: in May 2010, 20 groups representing agricultural producers wrote to the Obama administration requesting that market access schedules and accompanying ROOs in existing US PTAs not be changed as part of the TPP negotiations (TPP Digest 2010). Some sectors of US manufacturing have also opposed the TPP, most notably the National Council of Textile Organizations, which argues that Vietnam should be excluded from the negotiations.

#### Government shutdown wrecks CDC disease monitoring – key to check outbreaks

**Walker, 11** – (Emily "Both Sides Claim Win as Shutdown Averted," Med Page Today, http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Washington-Watch/25826)//VP

The vast majority of employees at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would be furloughed if the government ceased operations, said an HHS spokesman. Because the CDC tracks new public health threats such as disease outbreaks, the worst-case scenario during a shutdown would be a massive outbreak of a food-borne illness or other communicable disease. The CDC's emergency operation center -- a command center for monitoring and coordinating CDC's emergency response to public health threats in the United States and abroad -- will remain open. The center is currently working on responses to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. But responses may be delayed, the spokesman said. "If a state were to call us and say 'We need help,' we may not be able to respond quickly," the spokesman said. While emergency workers will continue their jobs, the staff who work to "get people out the door," by booking travel and facilitating meetings, won't be working. "This would prevent us from responding as quickly as we'd like," the spokesman said. In addition, the CDC's ability to detect an outbreak could be jeapordized, he said. "We have a lot of disease surveillance networks. If those are scaled back to just the staff that monitor those networks, it could conceivably lead to us not being able to detect an outbreak as quickly as we'd like to. We simply won't have the manpower we have right now," the HHS spokesman said.

#### Extinction

Quammen 12 – award-winning science writer, long-time columnist for Outside magazine for fifteen years, with work in National Geographic, Harper's, Rolling Stone, the New York Times Book Review and other periodicals (David, 9/29, “Could the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?,” The Guardian, pg. 29, Lexis)//VP

Infectious disease is all around us. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can seem grisly and dreadful, under ordinary conditions, it's every bit as natural as what lions do to wildebeests and zebras. But conditions aren't always ordinary. Just as predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new target. Aberrations occur. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a zoonosis. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic. It's a word of the future, destined for heavy use in the 21st century. Ebola and Marburg are zoonoses. So is bubonic plague. So was the so-called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox, bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia. Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of a pathogen that can "spillover", crossing into people from other animals. Aids is a disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their effects. Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years. Zoonotic pathogens can hide. The least conspicuous strategy is to lurk within what's called a reservoir host: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat? To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening 2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of Sars, the scenario could have been very much worse. Apart from the 2003 outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto. If the virus had arrived in a different sort of big city - more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical institutions - it might have burned through a much larger segment of humanity. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the 1918-1919 influenza. And that infamous global pandemic occurred in the era before globalisation. Everything nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses. When the Next Big One comes, it will likely conform to the same perverse pattern as the 1918 influenza: high infectivity preceding notable symptoms. That will help it move through cities and airports like an angel of death. The Next Big One is a subject that disease scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately, not every virus goes airborne from one host to another. If HIV-1 could, you and I might already be dead. If the rabies virus could, it would be the most horrific pathogen on the planet. The influenzas are well adapted for airborne transmission, which is why a new strain can circle the world within days. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary in 2003 to the people who understood it best. Human-to-human transmission is the crux. That capacity is what separates a bizarre, awful, localised, intermittent and mysterious disease (such as Ebola) from a global pandemic. Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing possibility. It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe: with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "As long as H5N1 is out there in the world," Webster told me, "there is the possibility of disaster. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God help us." We're unique in the history of mammals. No other primate has ever weighed upon the planet to anything like the degree we do. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant. We are an outbreak. And here's the thing about outbreaks: they **end**. In some cases they end after many years, in others they end rather soon. In some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again. Populations of tent caterpillars, for example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could account for such sudden and recurrent collapses? One possible factor is infectious disease, and viruses in particular.

## Manufacturing

#### Hegemony is resilient – the US is way ahead of everyone else

**Brooks and Wohlforth, 08** (Stephen G Brooks & William C. Wohlforth Associate Professors in the Department of Government @ Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance, p. 27-31)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United States spends more on defense that all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

#### 2. US withdrawal won’t cause power wars – forward deployment only encourages NATO growth and Russian expansionism

**Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 97** (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, doctoral candidates in political science at MIT. Harvey Sapolsky, professor of public policy at MIT. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. Spring 1997)

Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement. These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is greatest when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war. But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued US engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world's GOP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world's COP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states. But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe's strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.

## Ag

#### No impact- econ decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett ‘9(Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### Econ resilient

Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### Countries turn inward – no fighting

Lloyd **deMause,** director of The Institute for Psychohistory, “Nuclear War as an Anti-Sexual Group Fantasy” Updated December 18th **2002,** http://www.geocities.com/kidhistory/ja/nucsex.htm

The nation "turns inward" during this depressed phase **of the cycle.** Empirical studies **have** clearly demonstrate**d** that **major** economic downswings are accompanied by "introverted" foreign policy moods, characterized by fewer armed expeditions**, less interest in foreign affairs in the speeches of leaders,** reduced military expenditures, etc**.** (Klingberg, 1952; Holmes, 1985). Just as depressed people experience little conscious rage--feeling "I deserve to be killed" rather than "I want to kill others" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 393)-**-**interest in military adventures **during the depressed phase wanes, arms expeditures** decrease and peace treaties multiply.

#### Seed vault solves any crop loss- best backup there is

Magness 7/10- reporter (Judy, “Arctic Seed Vault Preserves the World’s Agricultural Supply”, The Suit, July 10th, 2013, http://www.thesuitmagazine.com/technology/science/22006-arctic-seed-vault-preserves-the-worlds-agricultural-supply.html)//SQR

In the Arctic Ocean, about 800 miles from the North Pole and midway to mainland Norway is the Svalbard archipelago, a remote island cluster, two-thirds of which is covered with glaciers. Built into the mountainside on the remote island of Spitsbergen sits what Time Magazine deemed one of the best inventions of 2008. Dubbed “Noah’s Ark for Seeds,” “The Fort Knox of Food” and also a more ominous “Doomsday Vault,” these are the most popular nicknames tossed around by the media. Officially, its name is the Svalbard Global Seed Vault – and it is a fortress, built specifically for protecting and housing the world’s largest collection of humankind's smallest, but most important agricultural assets – seeds. The concept of the Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) is often compared to that of a safe deposit box in a bank. The Norwegian government, which fully funded the $9 million construction project owns the building – just as a bank owns its building. Depositors from over 1,500 seed banks around the world own the seeds they deposit; no one else has access to any other depositor’s seeds but the depositor. These individual seed banks send duplicates of the seed samples in their collections to the Vault for safe storage. Every single seed in Svalbard is therefore considered a back-up for these native seed collections, garnered from the world’s crops. The Vault is managed by three entities: the Global Crop Diversity Trust, an independent international organization whose mission it is “to ensure the conservation and availability of crop diversity for food security worldwide”; the Nordic Genetic Resource Center (NordGen), “a Nordic organization dedicated to the safeguarding and sustainable use of plants, farm animals and forest lands”; and the Government of Norway. Governments around the world are among the primary sources of funding for the Trust, along with private organizations, including The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Name a seed and chances are it’s in the Vault, which according to the Trust, holds over 700,000 samples from almost every country in the world. The need for such extravagant measures to safeguard the world’s seed collections is two-fold. First, climate change, along with increases in world population are challenging current agricultural production, creating a need for new varieties of crops. Second, while there are over 1,500 seed banks around the world doing due diligence to protect their native plant collections, scientists and conservationists have long been concerned about the vulnerability of these institutions to the ravages of weather, war, poor management and lack of funding. Should the contents of their collection be destroyed for any reason, the native crops could possibly face extinction in a crisis. The Trust describes the Svalbard Global Seed Vault – located in the town of Longyearbyen, the largest settlement in the Svalbard archipelago – as a “fail-safe, state-of-the-art seed storage facility that has been built to stand the test of time – and survive natural disasters.” Opening in 2008, construction of the Vault took eight months which is a remarkable achievement, considering the environment, operational logistics and the unique design of the facility. All construction materials and building equipment, for instance, had to be delivered to the Arctic by ship or plane, including giant machinery capable of tunneling into the mountainside. The engineering and security surrounding the Vault is also fascinating. “The world has trusted the Vault with its seeds, and all possible measures to keep the seeds safe in the Vault have been taken,” according to the Trust. For starters, polar bears are on point 24/7 roaming the area – somewhat akin to a natural team of security guards. “Anyone seeking access to the seeds themselves has to pass through four locked doors: the heavy steel entrance doors, a second door approximately 115 meters down the tunnel and finally the two doors to the Vault rooms. Keys are coded to allow access to different levels of the facility. No single key unlocks all of the doors.” While there is no daily staff on-site (aside from the polar bears), local officials use motion detectors, electronic surveillance and NordGen representatives visit the Vault regularly to check in new seed shipments and to monitor the facility. While the seed Vault is not considered high on the list of targets for terrorist attacks, preventative measures in addition to the secured facility are being taken, including airport x-ray screenings of seed shipments, checking for explosives. Besides engineering and security attributes of the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, there are many reasons why the Arctic environment is an optimum location for preservation. Built into the mountain at 430 ft. above sea level to keep the area dry, the interior of the mountain provides superior insulation, low humidity and no detectable radiation. According to the Trust, “Permafrost (permanently frozen subsoil) and thick rock ensure that even in the case of a power outage, the seed samples will remain frozen. The Vault can therefore be considered the ultimate insurance policy for the world’s food supply. It will secure for centuries, millions of seeds representing every important crop variety available in the world today.”

# Block

## 2NC CP

#### AT Add-On:

#### Space primacy causes full on arms race

Zhang 11 (Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article. Email: <bzhang@ln.edu.hk>. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship” accessed by means of JSTOR, Donnie)

In both cases, Chinese security experts believethat the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. **quest for “absolute security**” evokes **countermeasures** from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”10 According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures.The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance.This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, “America’s domination of the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.”12 The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: “Today, the U.S. is the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminence—providing a solid foundation for our national security.”14 General Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command, points out the importance of space dominance: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.”15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force released a White Paper called The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley made a similar statement: “No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority”; thus, “the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance. Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic spectrum.”16 This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population fromnuclear weapons and other threats, **other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world**. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, “I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is space dominance, and that’s what the rest of the world won’t accept.”17 Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China’s national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for “absolute security” **jeopardizes** other countries’ security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, “In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.”18 The study also points out that the U.S. is the first country to develop a full set of doctrines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-term strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and revealed the goals of allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemy’s land, sea, air, and space targets. World opinion believes this represented the formal debut of U.S. space war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military toward space war.19 Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war,also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.”He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.”20

## 2NC K

#### **The** strive for hegemonic dominance fuels competitive economics

**Ciccantell 1** – Ph.D in sociology from University of Wisconsin (Paul, “NAFTA and the Reconstruction of U.S. Hegemony: The Raw Materials Foundations of Economic Competitiveness.(Statistical Data Included)”, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-79030076.html)//VP

The nature of hegemony has been the subject of significant debate in the social science literature (see, e.g., Krasner, 1978; Vernon, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Wallerstein, 1984; Kennedy, 1987; Modelski and Thompson, 1988; ChaseDunn, 1989; Arrighi, 1994). This analysis follows the definition of hegemony developed by Arrighi (1994: 27): "the power of a state to exercise functions of leadership and governance over a system of sovereign states." This definition emphasizes the multidimensional character of hegemony, encompassing economic, political, military and cultural power. Some analyses of hegemony examined the role of raw materials in hegemonic rivalry in earlier eras (Krasner, 1978; Vernon, 1983; Keohane, 1984; and Arrighi, 1994). However, none systematically incorporated raw materials and, more broadly, the critical relationship between capitalist economic growth and natural production systems, and discussions of hegemony in the current era of globalization focus on political and cultural dimensions of hegemon y and largely ignore material processes. Globalization increasingly links economies, polities and societies (Boxill, 1994; Harvey, 1995; Holm and Sorenson, 1995; Sunkel, 1995; Amin, 1996; Arrighi, 1998; Woods, 1998). Although some analysts argued that this integration reduces the role of the state (Harvey, 1995; Holm and Sorenson, 1995; Strange, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1998; Yaghmaian, 1998), a more accurate conceptualization of the role of the state in the current era focuses on the transformation of the role of the state (Shaw, 1997; Garrett, 1998; Robertson and Khondker, 1998; Swank, 1998; Ciccantell, 2000). States still strategize and act in support of national economic and political interests, especially as sites of production, consumption and capital accumulation (see Ciccantell, 2000). In particular, states retain their role as battlegrounds between competing interests of a variety of social classes and groups, even though these interests have been reshaped by globalization (Biersteker, 1998; Hobsbawm, 1998; Sklair, 1998). New historical materialism (Bunker and Ciccantell, 1995a and 1995b; Ciccantell and Bunker, 1998 and 1999; Ciccantell, 1999 and 2000) focuses on the natural and social material processes that underlie economic ascent and hegemonic maintenance and how these material processes shape social processes of establishing and maintaining models of state-firm relations in core nations, institutional and technological innovations to promote economic growth in rising economies, and core-periphery relations to support economic ascent. Analysing the role of raw materials in efforts to reconstitute U.S. hegemony in the current era extends the new historical materialist model.

#### The aggressive nature of our economic system forces military expansion – root cause of your economy claims

**Mooers 6** – Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University (Colin, “The New Imperialists”,2006, pg 3-4)//VP

To answer these questions we must begin with what is “new” about the “new imperialism.” First, it would be a mistake to view the recent U.S. turn to “preemptive” military action solely in terms of a reaction to the events of September 11th, or, more sinisterly, as the pre-planned goal of bellicose neoconservatives. That the Bush administration is more willing to resort to large-scale military intervention than previous administrations is undoubtedly true. However, to see this as a fundamental change in the nature of U.S. imperialism would be an exaggeration. The U.S.A. has a long and unbroken history of imperial conquest stretching back more than two centuries. It would be equally MOOERS: Introduction 3one-sided to see the invasion of Iraq as only about oil. Control of Middle Eastern oil reserves would give the U.S.A. an indisputable advantage over potential rivals, notably the fast rising powers of Asia. But if oil is a crucial part of the equation, the Iraq war is also part of a much wider “radical, punitive, ‘extra-economic’ restructuring of the conditions necessary for expanded profitability – paving the way, in short, for new rounds of American-led dispossession and capital accumulation … a new form of military neoliberalism.” 7 But, while America is still the preeminent military power on the planet, its superiority in firepower vastly exceeds its economic supremacy. 8 It is this imbalance between its economic and its military might that helps account for the shift to a more aggressive military posture. Thus, the drive of neoconservatives toward a more coercive orientation in international relations is intended to send a message not only to so-called “rogue” regimes and “failed” states, but also to its major economic competitors. In other words, while proximate causes are important in accounting for the emergence of the new imperialism, we need to situate these changes within the deep structural shifts in global capitalism that have occurred over the past two decades

#### Heg collapses the economy

Eland, 2k2

[Ivan, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Cato Policy Analysis No. 459, "The Empire Strikes Out: The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws," November 26, 2002, <online> <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf>, pg. 12]

The United States accounts for about 40 percent of total worldwide defense spending, up from 28 percent in the mid-1980s, the height of the Reagan military buildup. That’s two and a half times the combined spending of all its potential rivals.79 But, as an indication of its overextension, the United States accounts for only 29 percent of the world’s GDP. Another comparison indicates that U.S. allies are free riding: although the U.S. economy is larger than the next three largest economies on the planet—those of Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom—U.S. defense spending is larger than that of the next 15 highest defense spending nations, most of which are rich U.S. allies.80 With the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has already requested an additional $45.5 billion for 2003, bringing the total to $396 billion, an increase of 13 percent. In all, the administration plans to spend $2.1 trillion on the military over the next five years, which will raise annual U.S defense spending 15 percent above the Cold War average.81How much more the strategy of empire will cost is unclear. Also, foreign aid, nation building, and other activities related to the strategy are not free. The Bush administration recently pledged to substantially increase America’s core development assistance by 50 percent.82 And American efforts at nation building in tiny Bosnia and Kosovo have cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $21 billion so far.83 The more dependents and protectorates Washington takes on, the greater the burden on the U.S. economy will be.

#### Concepts such as hegemony are threat constructions to maintain elite power

**Bialasiewicz et al, 07** a Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London (Luiza Bialasiewicz, 2007, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy”, Political Geography, 405-422)//ah

It is telling just how spatialised some of these speciﬁcations become when worked through in detail. Already in 2000, PNAC argued that the major military mission is no longer to deter Soviet expansionism, but to ‘‘secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war’’ (PNAC, 2000: 2). They suggested that rather than the Cold War’s ‘‘potential global war across many theatres’’, the concern now is for several ‘‘potential theatre wars spread across the globe’’ fought against ‘‘separate and distinct adversaries pursuing separate and distinct goals’’ (2000: 2, 3). To counter such threats, the US needs to station its troops broadly, and their presence ‘‘in critical regions around the world is the visible expression of the extent of America’s status as a superpower and as the guarantor of liberty, peace and stability’’ (2000: 14). They claimed that while US security interests have ‘‘expanded’’, and that its forces ‘‘provide the ﬁrst line of defense in what may be 410 L. Bialasiewicz et al. / Political Geography 26 (2007) 405e422Author's personal copy described as the ‘American security perimeter’’’, at the same time ‘‘the worldwide archipelago of U.S. military installations has contracted’’ (2000: 14, 15). Because the security perimeter ‘‘has expanded slowly but inexorably’’ since the end of the Cold War, US forces e ‘‘the cavalry on the new American frontier’’ e ‘‘must be positioned to reﬂect the shifting strategic landscape’’ (2000: 14, 15). Equally, their use of the term ‘homeland’ drew strongly on its use in the Clinton administration e and preﬁgured the creation of the Ofﬁce for Homeland Security under G.W. Bush, with the concept strengthened by both the PATRIOT acts and the establishment of U.S. Northern Command. Again, **it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways ‘‘the world is’’ and, in so doing, actively (re)making that same world**. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies speciﬁcally with the ways in which the US portrays e and over the past decade has portrayed e certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, ‘‘states of concern’’, as ‘‘global hotspots’’, as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the ‘‘integrated’’ zones of democratic peace, US security e both economically and militarily e can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that emerged to ﬁll the post-Soviet void e from radical Islam through the war on drugs to ‘‘rogue states’’ (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin & Simon, 2003; Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of ‘‘rogue states’’ see Blum, 2002; Litwak, 2000).

#### Trade promotes globalization and liberal economic policies causing more harm than benefits

**Szentes, 08** – Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 5-6, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG

 (c)The wave of liberalisation, involving both the progress in liberalisation of international trade and capital flows, and the worldwide spread of liberal economic policy of government, undoubtedly promotes globalisation and the growth of world trade and capital flows, on the one hand, but benefits more the stronger, the more developed partners, on the other. Trade liberalisation always works in favour of those with higher competitiveness, i.e. the more developed partners. "Capital account" liberalisation promotes rapid and fluctuating flows of "hot money", i.e. speculation-motivated transactions,rather than long-term investments, thereby contributes to the instability of the international monetary system, and the spread ("contagion") of disturbances in money markets. A too rapid, full and unprepared liberalisation, particularly in the field of finance,often causes more harm than benefit, as it was experienced by several developing and “transition” (former “socialist”) countries, where it led to a fall of economic growthand, in fact, to bigger disturbances in the economy than the preceding policy of state regulation.Liberalisationtends to sharpen competition, which stimulates technological progress, but may discourage cooperation, and by its disequalising effects contributes to the growth of international development gap under the conditions of the lack of institutionalised correcting- compensating mechanism. Such a mechanism would also require global governance.The international literature pays particular attention to various other effects of globalisation. Such as concerning “national sovereignty”, social welfare policies, national cultures, political conditions and convergence or divergence tendencies.

#### Neolib engenders its own crises – pure focus on production and consumption makes solutions to structural inequalities impossible – their failure to recognize social injustices created by capital dooms solvency and naturalizes exploitative structures – only the critique accesses root cause – best piece of evidence – their authors are all bought off, reject them

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon (Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>)//VP

The **current** version of **capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars** (and even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, **was** consciously shaped **to co-opt the language of social movements seeking freedom** from the yolk of capitalism and imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social science today, **the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write** the history of **capitalist development as** “the constitution of liberty,” and **the basis of free society** (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). **There can be no acknowledgement of** slavery**,** racism**,** sexism**, or** ecological destruction among other issues, **because all of these undermine the** basic thesis neoliberal writers actively promote as political ideology. To make their argument, **these writers must present capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot** (Friedman 2005, 2008). Unfortunately, **these ideas dominate the political sphere**, and contemporary notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, **many “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences** owing to globalization” (Pellow 2007, 41). **The blinders imposed by this view** continue to infect energy studies despite the work of critical energy scholars. **Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with inequalities caused by oppression** based on race, class, gender, and position in the world system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social relations remain intact because **the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because it is the logic of capitalism** (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). **The processes of capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in which those integrated into the market economy live**, as fish swim in water, they are the “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006). In contrast to the modernization thesis, **environmental justice scholars**, among other critical theorists and activists **have sought to expose the mythological basis of neoliberalism and transcend the system**. The work of environmental justice scholars, feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, represent powerful **critiques of the modernization thesis**. Taken together with the insights in existing critical work on energy, they **provide an alternative approach to energy that** belies **the notion that “there is no alternative.”** They share a common commitment, as social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual **class and racial inequalities** around the global and between North and South **have only worsened in the past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took hold”** (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact **economic globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement** and the general antiracist struggle in the United States **and undercut the global benefits of the anticolonial struggles** occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural world itself”(43). Today, **neoliberal mythology has** severely **hindered the development of a wider environmental justice consciousness** in the broader public, and amongst activists and academics. In energy studies **this view is especially pronounced in the focus on technology**, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, **and alternative energies that basically allow business to** continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned **scholars and activists who buy into** the main tenets of **the modernization thesis**, and thus **are reluctant to break with capitalism as a system, or** worse, they **promote it, ignoring or ignorant of the enormous costs**. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long **as we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses shouldering the costs of their polluting practices**, long-term, **internalizing** more of the world in **the market system is a** total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing the internalities.” **This is an** ecological **and** social **imperative**. Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-thannothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the new biotech boom also make sense. **If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must be found at every turn and crises represent** especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, **capital was never developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have** no rational response. The problem is that **capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of** real alternatives**, and understand ourselves as subjects**, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

#### social resistance is important, but the alt is not a utopian

**Munck, 03** - professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf)//VP

A progressive alternative to real neoliberalism might be developed by critical intellectuals, and articulated by leftist political parties but, arguably, without a mobilised civil society all this will not come to fruition. A cowed, disorientated and demobilised civil society will be a poor vehicle for progressive transforma- tion of any kind. **This is not a simplistic, utopian, or even ultimately a manipula- tive argument for a politics 'from below'** to counter the dominant politics 'from above'. It is just that, if we look at Chile, Brazil, Central America, we see that where and when civil society has become activated, progressive or democratic alternatives are more likely to prosper. The World Bank certainly understands fully the importance of civil society in achieving social support for neoliberal globalisation and giving it a social 'face'. Certainly for a progressive alternative it will be necessary to recover alternatives from the anti-authoritarian democratic socialist traditions to counter the current infatuation with building 'social capital', a discursive terrain firmly dominated by the new global technocracy.

#### Permutation coopts revolutionary potential- empirically proven in Latin America

EMIR SADER, PhD Poli Sci Univ of Sau Paolo THE WEAKEST LINK? Neoliberalism in Latin America New Left Review 52, July-August 2008 <http://newleftreview.org/II/52/emir-sader-the-weakest-link-neoliberalism-in-latin-america>

Cross-cutting these political cycles, three overall strategies of the Latin American left can be discerned. The first sequence, dating back to the 1940s, was one of major structural reforms contemporaneous with the hegemony of the import-substitution model. The left opted for an alliance with sectors of the national business elite in the name of economic modernization, agrarian reform and a certain autonomy with respect to Northern imperialism. This strategy was implemented by legendary nationalist leaders such as Getúlio Vargas of Brazil, Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico and Juan Perón of Argentina, in concert with parties of the left or centre-left. In Chile, textbook cases of this approach were the Popular Front of 1938 and the Allende administration in 1970–73. But the programme failed at the same time as the industrialization effort, when the internationalization of economies pushed the corporate elites into solid alliance with international capital, laying the groundwork for the eventual neoliberal model. These same entrepreneurs also supported the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone, making no secret of their readiness to liquidate the popular movement for the sake of an export-centred economy geared to luxury domestic consumption by way of intense labour exploitation. Allende’s government, based on the Communist and Socialist parties, with a programme that envisaged the nationalization of 150 leading corporations, constituted the most advanced example of the attempt to progress from reformist policies to a socialist overcoming of capitalism. Among the multiple reasons for its defeat, there can be no doubt that the fact that Allende started out with just 34 per cent of the vote, and that three years later his government’s share had only risen to 44 per cent, was a major obstacle for implementing such a radical programme. Unidad Popular also underestimated the class nature of the state. It neglected therefore to institute an alternative power outside the traditional apparatus, which ultimately cornered and smothered the executive. The Chilean and Uruguayan military coups were carried out in the year that marked the transition from a long, expansive cycle to a recessive one, triggered by the oil crisis of 1973. A page of history had been definitively turned, and with it one strategy of the Latin American left was now closed. A second great strategy emerged with the Cuban revolution. Any revolutionary victory—above all when it is the first of its kind in a whole region—carries charismatic persuasive force, as we know from the Russian and Chinese experiences in 1917 and 1949. The Cuban triumph coincided with the end of the cycle of Latin American economic expansion under the popular governments and democratic regimes that had prevailed over much of the continent during the 1940s and 50s. The first Argentine coup was carried out in 1955, the second in 1966; the Brazilian and Bolivian coups took place in 1964, and already by 1954 Guatemala was in the throes of counter-revolution. It seemed that the cycle of democratic governments had run its course, in parallel with the economic crises. It was then that Cuba unexpectedly presented an alternative route, in contrast to the impasse that popular struggles in other countries had reached under their traditional leaderships. Latin America was no stranger to guerrilla movements; it had known rural insurgencies such as those of Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1930s, as well as the national-revolutionary struggles in Mexico in the 1910s, or in Bolivia in 1952. Yet events in Cuba radiated a special appeal, pointing the way to a new epoch for the left. Due to the similarity of levels of development reached at that period by most of the countries of Latin America, the Cuban revolution was immediately more influential in the region than the Russian revolution had been in Europe in its day. All the more so, thanks to the way it was presented by such—attractive, if misguided—codifications as Régis Debray’s account of the Cuban experience and how it might be replicated in other countries and continents. The massive congresses hosted by Cuba—Tricontinental (1965) and OLAS (1966)—were instrumental in giving huge momentum and worldwide publicity to the new strategy, which was also exemplified by the activities of Che Guevara in Africa and Latin America. The guerrilla struggles played out in three distinct phases over the next decades. The first, in the 1960s, had a rural character, with hubs in Venezuela, Guatemala and Peru; it ended with Che’s death in Bolivia just as he was attempting to coordinate these with other movements that were beginning to appear in Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina. The second phase was that of the urban guerrillas in the three latter countries, which operated between the late 1960s and early 1970s. The third phase was once more based in the countryside, inspired by the victory of the Sandinistas in 1979, and centred throughout the 1980s chiefly in Guatemala and El Salvador. The Sandinista electoral defeat in 1990 coincided with the shift to a unipolar world under the imperial hegemony of the US, which put an end to the viability of guerrilla strategies. The impossibility of military victory in other countries forced Guatemalan and Salvadoran fighters to reinsert themselves into mainstream political institutions, and the heyday of guerrillero strategies was basically over. At the same time, the global realignment after 1990 had far-reaching consequences for the parties of the traditional left, both nationalist and social-democratic. Their adherence to neoliberal policies, and the effects of these policies themselves, disabled the trade-union movements and the broader gamut of left-wing forces. The collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp precipitated a conclusive crisis for Communist parties across the continent. Several changed their names and even their natures, as was the case with the Brazilian CP; others simply faded away, while those that survived were left in social, political and ideological quarantine. The other forces of the left were variously affected by the new conditions. The Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), the Uruguayan Frente Amplio and the Nicaraguan Frente Sandinista all evolved into parties of the centre-left, accepting when in power the economic models they had fought against in opposition. Of the former guerrilla groupings, only the Frente Farabundo Martí of El Salvador has managed to survive as a significant political force since laying down its arms. The MIR in Chile, the Montoneros and the PRT–ERP in Argentina, the ALN and the VPR in Brazil, and the guerrilla groups in Peru and Venezuela have all been dissolved, whilst the Tupamaros in Uruguay have reinvented themselves as a political force that bears no relationship to their past as a guerrilla movement.

#### Not sustainable- the aff props up the neoliberalist system that organizes social relations around a market model that’s driving the planet toward irreversible collapse

**De Angelis, 12** – Professor of Political Economy and Development at the University of East London (Massimo, “Crises, Movements and Commons,” Borderlands E-Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol11no2\_2012/deangelis\_crises.pdf)//VP

**The world is** today **traversed by several crises**, which raises the pressing question of their solutions. The **recurrent and intensified crises of** precarity and livelihoods, of **environmental degradation, climate change and** of **social justice, all point to a global context that would** **require a radical reconfiguration of social relations**, a new world, **new social systems articulating our production in common**. **But** **how and whether** **these crises will be an opportunity to embark on** this journey of **transformation of social reproduction** **is not** clear nor is it **given**. **While social contestations are gaining momentum** in a variety of theatres and contexts, it is clear that **neoliberal capital seems adamant** **that it can** **push through a new phase of global governance** **without questioning the basic structures and policies that have precipitated the financial crisis in 2008** **with the** consequent **intensification of all other crises**. Indeed, not only the remaining bundle of social entitlements and rights are under threat under intensifying austerity policies around the world. There are also clear signs that the multimillion dollar operation that rescued banks in 2008 is now being institutionalised into the DNA of modern neoliberal capital governance. In Europe, for example, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is being set up as a permanent rescue-funding programme to succeed the temporary ad hoc mechanisms set up in the rescue operation of the financial system. Not only ‘the granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality’ (European Council 2012). Also, upon joining the mechanism, the countries involved will be obliged to contribute funding to the rescue package. Neoliberalism has never been about the withdrawal of the state from welfare, but the shift in the modality of welfare from the poor to the rich. In the first part of the neoliberal period, from the late 1970s, this amounted to slash in social services, privatisation, cut in higher tax rates and subsidies to exporters and incentives to foreign investors. In the middle part from the mid 1990s it was all about finding ways to govern the wasteland created and the conflict generated therein. After the attempt to incite the masses to work for the country in the war on terror period (from 2001), in this last fourth phase after the crisis of 2008, capital demands that public money is functionally funneled into the rescue of banks and the maintenance of the disciplinary function of finance without which modern capitalism could not operate. **In the** early **1980s we were told to look up at the world of finance for inspiration on how ‘betterment’ for all could be achieved with rigor and entrepreneurial risk taking**. **In the** early **2010s we are told to** **pay with rigor the austerity necessary to compensate the failed risk taking of the 1%,** **otherwise the entire paper castle would fall, with us inside**. And **we are told to accept this is the** **de-facto norm of our systemic interaction with one another**. **Yet**, in spite of waiving the safety net for the financial system, **capital seems to be at an impossible crossroad**. On one hand, **it needs nonfinancial growth to buffer, accommodate and decompose struggles**, **and**, at the same time, to **fulfill its drive for accumulation and allow some debt to be repaid**. **On the other hand,** however, today more than ever, **growth can only exacerbate the contradictions at the basis of these struggles,** if only **because there cannot be any overall growth with** **simultaneous reduction in greenhouse emissions, nor** **without an intensification of existing inequalities** also caused by the operations of current financial systems that governments are so eager to rescue. This crossroad is not avoided if instead of a future scenario of growth we postulate one of stagnation or de-growth. If on one hand this scenario would somehow mitigate the pressures on climate change, **in so far as capitalist relations remain dominant** **in articulating and valuing social co-operation, it would do so with heavy social costs and at a likely intensification of** precarity, social injustice and **social conflict** against these. In both scenarios, and given the historical experiences in other crises and looking at current dynamics, we can postulate the development of four phenomena. First, the growth of struggles of different sectors within the global society throwing a spanner in the wheel and resisting the reduction in rights and entitlements necessary for further neoliberal governance of the crisis, against debt and demanding some form of re-distributive justice to the state. This is what we will refer to as social movements. Second, the growth of collective self-help solutions to the problems of social reproduction faced by communities. This corresponds to what we call the development of the commons. Third, the development and refinement of capital’s commons cooptation strategies, or what I have elsewhere (De Angelis 2012) called commons fix. Fourth, the development and refinement of strategies of repression of struggles and enclosures of commons. In this paper I will not discuss in detail these four postulated developments, but problematise the interrelation among the first three for the purpose of contributing to the debate over the establishment of alternatives to capitalism. Indeed, **what underpins this analysis is an attempt to** answer, or at least **develop a framework with which to start to answer an important naïve question**. **The role of naïve questions**, Socrates taught us, **is to problematise the systems of knowledge at the basis of our certainties**, **of our mental schemes through which we give meaning to the world around us and thus intervene in it**. In this paper I want to address very big and naïve questions, in fact, meta-questions at the basis of what we may call a critical theory of the commons. **How can social movements and struggles change the world?** And how can they do it **in the direction of a far better place for all** (or at least the ‘99%’), **more convivial and cohesive, socially economically and environmentally just, where dignity, peace**, freedom, autonomy, solidarity, conviviality, **equality are** not so much articles of faith, but **guiding values of an orienting compass of ongoing social transformation?** I do not intend nor aspire to provide a firm answer, as this can really be generated through praxis. Here I only want to discuss few points that I believe must be considered as part of the answer.

## 1NR Ag

#### Countries turn inward – no fighting

Lloyd **deMause,** director of The Institute for Psychohistory, “Nuclear War as an Anti-Sexual Group Fantasy” Updated December 18th **2002,** http://www.geocities.com/kidhistory/ja/nucsex.htm

The nation "turns inward" during this depressed phase **of the cycle.** Empirical studies **have** clearly demonstrate**d** that **major** economic downswings are accompanied by "introverted" foreign policy moods, characterized by fewer armed expeditions**, less interest in foreign affairs in the speeches of leaders,** reduced military expenditures, etc**.** (Klingberg, 1952; Holmes, 1985). Just as depressed people experience little conscious rage--feeling "I deserve to be killed" rather than "I want to kill others" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 393)-**-**interest in military adventures **during the depressed phase wanes, arms expeditures** decrease and peace treaties multiply.

#### No causal relationship – ignores other variables

Niall **Ferguson** (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) **2006** Foreign Affairs, September/October, Vol. 85, Issue 5

**Nor can economic crises explain** the **bloodshed. What may be** the most familiar causal chain **in modern historiography** links **the Great** Depression to the **rise of fascism and the** outbreak of **World** War **II. But** that simple story leaves too much out**.** Nazi **Germany started the war** in Europe only **after its economy had recovered.** Not all **the** countries affected **by the Great Depression** were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe**, and some** severe economic crises were not followed by wars**.**

#### No scenario for environmental destruction causing extinction

Easterbrook, 3 – Distinguished Fellow, Fulbright Foundation (Gregg, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

## 1NR Politics

**No impact to cyber attack**

**Fox 11** 7/2, \*Stuart Fox: Assistant Editor, Innovation News Daily, “Why Cyberwar Is Unlikely,” http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/830-cyberwar-unlikely-deterrence-cyber-war.html, AJ

Even as more and more countries invest in the idea of cyberwarfare, **cyberspace remains largely peaceful** insofar as actual war is concerned. In the two decades since cyberwar first became possible, there hasn't been a single event that politicians, generals and security experts agree on as having passed the threshold for strategic cyberwar. In fact, the attacks that have occurred have fallen so far short of a proper cyberwar that many have **begun to doubt that cyberwarfare is even possible**. The reluctance to engage in strategic cyberwarfare stems mostly from the uncertain results such a conflict would bring, the lack of motivation on the part of the possible combatants and their shared inability to defend against counterattacks. Many of the systems that an aggressive cyberattack would damage are actually as valuable to any potential attacker as they would be to the victim. The five countries capable of large-scale cyberwar (Israel, the U.S., the U.K., Russia and China) have more to lose if a cyberwar were to escalate into a shooting war than they would gain from a successful cyberattack. "The half-dozen countries that have cyber capability are **deterred from cyberwar because of the fear of the American response**. Nobody wants this to spiral out of control," said James Lewis, senior fellow and director of technology and public policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. "The countries that are capable of doing this don't have a reason to," Lewis added. "Chinese officials have said to me, 'Why would we bring down Wall Street when we own so much of it?' They like money almost as much as we do." **Deterrence plays a major factor in preventing cyberwar**. Attacks across the Internet would favor the aggressor so heavily that no country has developed an effective defense. Should one country initiate a cyberattack, the victim could quickly counter-attack, leaving both countries equally degraded, Lewis told InnovationNewsDaily. Even if an attacker were to overcome his fear of retaliation, the low rate of success would naturally give him pause. Any cyberattack would target the types of complex systems that could collapse on their own, such as electrical systems or banking networks. But experience gained in fixing day-to-day problems on those systems would allow the engineers who maintain them to quickly undo damage caused by even the most complex cyberattack, said George Smith, a senior fellow at Globalsecurity.org in Alexandria, Va. "You mean to tell me that the people who work the electrical system 24 hours a day don't respond to problems? What prevents people from turning the lights right back on?" Smith told SecurityNewsDaily. "And attacks on the financial system have always been a non-starter for me. I mean, [in 2008] the financial system attacked the U.S.!" Of course, just because political, technological and economic concerns have prevented cyberwar thus far does not mean the situation cannot change. Some analysts believe that the cost of getting caught flatfooted by a cyberattack more than justifies investing in protection against future threats. "The situation could change," said Sami Saydjari, chairman of Professionals for Cyber Defense, a organization formed to "advocate, advise and advance sound cyber defense policy for the United States of America." "For example, if we ended up in a shooting war with China, for whatever reason, they have a capability to take out our infrastructure," Saydjari said. "We don't want them to be able to do that. We don't want our enemies to even have the potential to do that, even if they currently have no incentive to do so." And then there's the issue of terrorism. Undeterred by possible counterattack and unencumbered by economic and political ties, terrorist groups make the most feared attackers in a hypothetical cyberwar. "One day we're going to wake up and find that Al Qaeda or one of these more extreme groups will get this capability. That's what I worry about," Lewis said. "They don't have this capability now. There’s some indication that they know about the black market. But it's like them trying to acquire any other advanced weapon system." But so far, **there's no evidence that any terrorist group plans on launching a cyberattack against the U.S.** In fact, there's not really any evidence that any country plans on initiating cyberwar against any other country in the near future. For the last 20 years, and into the foreseeable future, it's remained all quiet in the cyber front. "I would give people who say there's an enormous cyber threat the benefit of the doubt. But I've been hearing this for close to twenty years now," said Martin Libicki, a senior policy analyst in cyber issues for the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, Calif. "Twenty years after Kitty Hawk, airplanes were an integral part of warfare," Libicki said. "By comparison, cyberwar hasn't advanced nearly as quickly."

#### 1) He’s winning because he’s using capital to unify Democrats and exploit GOP divisions

**Allen, 9/19/13** (Jonathan, Politico, “GOP battles boost Obama” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/republicans-budget-obama-97093.html>)//VP

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened.

#### He just needs to stay the course

**Robinson, 9/20**/13 – Washington Post columnist (Eugene, “Obama Needs to Stand His Ground” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/09/20/obama_needs_to_stand_his_ground_120003.html>)//VP

Obama is by nature a reasonable and flexible man, but this time he must not yield. Even if you leave aside what delaying or defunding Obamacare would mean for his legacy -- erasing his most significant domestic accomplishment -- it would be irresponsible for him to bow to the GOP zealots' demands. The practical impact of acquiescing would be huge. Individuals who have been uninsured are anticipating access to adequate care. State governments, insurance companies and health care providers have spent vast amounts of time and money preparing for the law to take effect. To suddenly say "never mind" would be unbelievably reckless. The political implication of compromising with blackmailers would be an unthinkable surrender of presidential authority. The next time he said "I will do this" or "I will not do that," why should Congress or the American people take him seriously? How could that possibly enhance Obama's image on the world stage? Obama has said he will not accept a budget deal that cripples Obamacare and will never negotiate on the debt ceiling. Even if the Republicans carry through with their threats -- and this may happen -- the president has no option but to stand his ground. You don't deal with bullies by making a deal to keep the peace. That only rewards and encourages them. You have to push back. The thing is, this showdown is a sure political loser for the GOP -- and smart Republicans know it. Boehner doesn't want this fight, and in fact should be grateful if Obama hangs tough and shows the crazies the limits of their power. Republicans in the Senate don't want this fight. It's doubtful that even a majority of House Republicans really, truly want this fight, no matter what they say publicly. But irresponsible demagogues -- I mean you, Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas -- have whipped the GOP base into a frenzy of unrealistic expectations. House members who balk at jumping off the cliff risk being labeled "moderate," which is the very worst thing you can call a Republican -- and the most likely thing to shorten his or her political career. The way to end this madness is by firmly saying no. If Boehner won't do it, Obama must.

#### Political capital key –

**1) Political capital is key to avoid making concessions on the debt ceiling**

**Garnham, 9/17/13** (Peter, “Summers not over for dollar strength” Euromoney, <http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3255829/Category/16/ChannelPage/0/Summers-not-over-for-dollar-strength.html?single=true&copyrightInfo=true>)//VP

That is because seeking his confirmation in the US Senate could have cost Obama **valuable political capital.** As Geoffrey Yu, strategist at UBS, points out, that could have meant that reaching an agreement on raising the debt ceiling afterwards would have therefore **required even greater concessions from Obama** and created additional fiscal drag on the US economy. Overall, it would seem the ripple effects from Summers’ withdrawal from the race to become Fed chairman and the negative impact on the dollar could disappear quickly.

**Regardless of general capital, the plan pushes immigration off the agenda—Hirsch concedes this** Michael Hirsh, National Journal, 2/7/13, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.

Economic integration with Mexico triggers trade union opposition

**Goforth 13** - teaches international political economy at Coastal Carolina University (Sean, “Mexico’s Pena Nieto Faces Tough Choices on Trade,” World Politics Review, 2/27/13, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12745/mexico-s-pena-nieto-faces-tough-choices-on-trade)//AC

But Mexico’s attempts to pursue further integration with the U.S. have met lukewarm receptions north of the border. And now the Obama administration is signaling that its trade priorities lie in negotiating a deal with the European Union, which would neatly skirt the trade union opposition that has historically sapped Washington’s enthusiasm for closer economic integration with Mexico.

#### Shift to domestic issues now – Obama balancing

Felsenthal 9/12

Mark, Reuters, Obama says is shifting to domestic priorities from Syria focus, 9/12/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-usa-obama-syria-idUSBRE98B0RF20130912

President Barack Obama said on Thursday he is shifting his focus to domestic priorities from a tense period during which he sought congressional approval to use military force against Syria for its suspected use of chemical weapons.¶ "Even as we have been spending a lot of time on the Syria issue and making sure that international attention is focused on the horrible tragedy that occurred there, it is still important to recognize that we've got a lot more stuff to do here in this government," the president said before a meeting with his Cabinet at the White House.¶ The president said he hopes meetings between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will result in action to eliminate Syria's ability to use chemical weapons again.¶ Obama has asked Congress to authorize military strikes against Syria in response to what the United States says was a chemical weapons attack by the government that killed more than 1,400 people on August 21. The issue is on hold pending diplomatic efforts to disarm Syria of chemical weapons.¶ "I am hopeful that the discussions that Secretary Kerry had with Foreign Minister Lavrov as well as some of the other players in this can yield a concrete result," Obama said.¶ Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were to hold talks on Syria in Geneva.¶ The president cited the budget, immigration, and implementation of his signature healthcare legislation as concerns he is turning to.¶ The administration faces daunting obstacles on all three fronts and a ticking clock on the budget in particular. Congressional Republicans have sought to eliminate funding for the health law, known as Obamacare, and want the president to agree to spending cuts in exchange for raising the nation's debt limit.¶ Lawmakers must pass legislation to continue funding for government operations by the end of the month or force a government shutdown. Failure to raise the nation's debt limit after a date expected in mid-October would trigger a debt default.